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Plurilateral Cooperation as an Alternative to
Trade Agreements: Innovating One Domain at
a Time
EUI and CEPR

Charles Sabel
Columbia Law School

Abstract
At the end of 2017 different groups of WTO members decided to launch talks on four subjects, setting aside the WTO consensus working practice. This paper argues that these ‘joint statement initiatives’ (JSIs) should seek to establish open plurilateral
agreements (OPAs) even in instances where the outcome can be incorporated into existing schedules of commitments of participating WTO members. Designing agreements as OPAs provides an institutional framework for collaboration among the
responsible national authorities, transparency, mutual review and learning, as well as alternatives to default WTO dispute settlement procedures which may not be appropriate for supporting cooperation on the matters addressed by the JSIs. In parallel, WTO members should establish enforceable multilateral principles to ensure OPAs are compatible with an open global
trade regime.

Since its establishment in 1995 the WTO has had little success in negotiating new disciplines on the use discriminatory
trade policies. Instead, new rulemaking has been occurring
in deep preferential trade agreements (PTAs) (D€
ur et al.,
2014). While beneﬁcial to participating countries, deep PTAs
are inherently constrained in addressing international policy
spillovers given that major emerging economies have not
been willing to participate in them. Such spillovers have
been increasing, reﬂecting a steady rise in competition-distorting trade measures in the last decade (Evenett, 2019),
many of which are only partially subject to WTO disciplines,
if at all. The inability to (re-)negotiate multilateral rules has
led to trade conﬂicts, notably between the US and China,
and impeded cooperation to address global market failures
and use trade policy for sustainable development.
Consensus-based decision-making has been a factor inhibiting the ability of the WTO to engage in deliberations on new
agreements. At the December 2017 Ministerial Conference,
groups of WTO members abandoned the long-standing consensus working practice and launched four ‘joint statement initiatives’ (JSIs) spanning e-commerce, domestic regulation of
services, investment facilitation, and measures to enhance the
ability of micro and small and medium enterprises (MSMEs) to
utilize the trade opportunities.1 This shift to plurilateral
engagement offers an alternative to the negotiation of (deep)
PTAs to countries seeking to bolster trade governance by providing a mechanism for countries to cooperate on an issuespeciﬁc basis without having to liberalize substantially all trade.
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In doing so it creates opportunities for cooperation without
requiring all 164 WTO members to agree.
This paper reﬂects on the question whether and how plurilateral cooperation can revitalize the WTO, focusing on the JSIs.
It builds on a previous article (Hoekman and Sabel, 2019) on
open plurilateral agreements (OPAs) as a vehicle to support
international regulatory cooperation in the WTO, arguing that
JSIs should be conceptualized as OPAs, complementing the
trade agreements that to date have been the staple of the
WTO. The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 brieﬂy discusses the ongoing JSI talks in the WTO and recent plurilateral
trade initiatives outside the WTO. Section 2 presents a typology of trade-related cooperation to address different types of
problems. Section 3 applies the typology to the JSIs and
argues that OPAs provide a useful institutional framework to
support the implementation of what is agreed in negotiations.
Section 4 discusses governance principles that could be
applied by WTO members to OPAs to ensure plurilateral initiatives are consistent with an open rules-based multilateral trading system. Section 5 concludes.

The nascent shift to plurilateral initiatives
Plurilateral cooperation is not new for the WTO. Many WTO
agreements are the outcome of negotiations among the
‘principal suppliers’ of products and the principal ‘demandeurs’ for rules pertaining to a given area of trade policy.
Although the practice has been to pursue cooperation
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through large ‘rounds’ that encompass many policy areas to
permit cross-issue linkages and tradeoffs with a view to satisfying the Pareto criterion and increasing the potential
gains from cooperation, in the GATT years there were several agreements that bound only signatories, ranging from
anti-dumping to product standards. Almost all came to be
incorporated as multilateral agreements when the WTO was
created in 1995, but GATT practice illustrates that plurilateral
agreements are nothing new for the trading system.2
The JSIs span a cross-section of the WTO membership.
The US participates in one (e-commerce). China and the EU
participate in all four.3 Independent of whether a WTO
member is a sponsor of a group, deliberations are open to
all WTO members. The e-commerce JSI talks involve
80 + WTO Members. Most are middle- and high-income
nations.4 The focus of deliberation is on a mix of trade
restrictive policies and digital trade facilitation.5 The former
include regulation of cross-border data ﬂows and data localization requirements, the latter include issues like electronic
signatures, e-invoicing, facilitating electronic payment for
cross-border transactions, and cooperation on consumer
protection (e.g., combatting fraud).
Services domestic regulation talks involve 60 + WTO
Members and center on matters associated with authorization and certiﬁcation of foreign services providers (licensing,
qualiﬁcation, and technical standards), not on substance of
regulations. The aim is to reduce the trade-impeding effects
of domestic regulation by enhancing transparency of policies through enquiry points; establishing good practice timeframes for processing of applications; acceptance of
electronic applications by service providers, use of objective
criteria, ensuring national authorizing bodies are independent and impartial, and mechanisms for foreign providers to
request domestic review of decisions.
Neither e-commerce nor services regulation are new for
the WTO. Both have been discussed since the late 1990s. A
WTO work program on e-commerce was initiated in 1998,
and a Working Party on Domestic Regulation was established in 1999. These work programs were anchored in existing WTO treaties. In the case of e-commerce this spans all
three of the major WTO multilateral agreements – GATT,
GATS, and TRIPS. The mandate of the working party on
domestic regulation of services was to develop horizontal
(cross-sectoral) disciplines called for in Art. VI GATS.
The MSME and investment facilitation groups differ from the
other two JSIs in not being tied to speciﬁc existing WTO agreements. The informal working group on MSMEs includes 90
WTO members.6 The aim is to identify measures governments
can take to support internationalization of small ﬁrms. Recommendations to this effect will not be mandatory but are open
to participating WTO members to adopt on a voluntary basis.7
Talks on investment facilitation were launched by some 70
WTO Members in Buenos Aires in 2017 and grew to encompass
more than 100 participants in late 2020.8 The agenda excludes
liberalization of inward FDI policies, measures related to protection of foreign investors and investor-State dispute settlement. The focus is solely on facilitation. All investment is
covered, including services, that is, facilitation of mode 3 is part
© 2021 Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

of the discussion. Talks center on ‘good regulatory practices’
such as transparency and predictability of investment-related
polices; streamlining administrative procedures; soliciting
feedback on proposed regulatory measures; information sharing on best practices and ex post monitoring and evaluation.
Outside the WTO, groups of countries have also begun to
negotiate plurilateral agreements that are distinct from PTAs
to address trade-related matters and nontrade policies. Examples include the Digital Economy Partnership Agreement
between Chile, New Zealand and Singapore,9 the Digital Economy Agreement between Australia and Singapore,10 the
Japan-US Agreement on Digital Trade,11 and negotiations
between Singapore and South Korea on a digital partnership
agreement.12 Observers have proposed extending such
arrangements to create a ‘single data areas’ encompassing
like-minded countries (Leblond and Aaronson, 2019). Beyond
the digital arena, there are ongoing negotiations between New
Zealand, Costa Rica, Fiji, Iceland, Norway, and Switzerland on a
plurilateral Agreement on Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability (ACCTS).13 The Asia-Paciﬁc digital agreements build on
the e-commerce chapters of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement on Trans-Paciﬁc Partnership (CPTPP) and bilateral PTAs. The purported goal of the ACCTS is to negotiate an
open plurilateral agreement, in the process demonstrating that
countries can agree on how trade policy and trade rules can
help drive the transformation of the economy to become more
sustainable and inclusive.

Horses for courses
Plurilateral initiatives differ from traditional trade agreements in that (i) they are issue-speciﬁc or combine a small
number of policy issues and (ii) do not center (solely) on liberalization of market access barriers. They raise important
conceptual – and practical – questions regarding the incentive constraints facing participants that determine the feasibility of negotiating and implementing agreements.
Trade agreements have four salient characteristics that are
relevant from the perspective of considering when and how
they may support – or impede – cooperation to reduce crossborder negative policy spillovers. First, they liberalize access to
markets through a process of reciprocal exchange of trade policy concessions. Reciprocity permits internalization of the beneﬁts of liberalization. Second, they rely on the national
treatment principle to prevent ‘concession erosion’ – the use
of domestic policies to substitute for trade policies, while leaving parties free to deﬁne their domestic regulations as they
wish as long as regulation is applied equally to domestic and
foreign agents. Third, there is a focus on trade facilitation as
well as liberalization, that is, efforts to reduce trade costs
through transparency and identiﬁcation of good policy practices. Fourth, they are self-enforcing: the threat of withdrawal
of market access commitments (retaliation) is the mechanism
used to sustain cooperation.
An implication of these characteristics is that by design
most PTAs are shallow integration instruments in the sense
that signatories retain national regulatory sovereignty: they
are free to regulate as they wish as long as measures
Global Policy (2021) 12:Suppl.3
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conform to the national treatment and most-favored-nation
(MFN) principles. ‘Deeper’ PTAs go beyond the four basic
characteristics by including provisions on the substance of
domestic regulation, intellectual property rights, foreign
investment, and product and factor markets more broadly.
Deeper integration touches on matters that are of interest
to a much broader constellation of domestic interest groups
and is therefore – appropriately – more politically sensitive
and complex than shallow trade agreements. However, the
core feature of all PTAs – shallow or deep – is preferential
liberalization of market access barriers.
In addition to PTAs, the WTO envisages two other forms of
plurilateral cooperation among members on a sector- or issuespeciﬁc basis. In contrast to a PTA, neither requires liberalization
of substantially all trade between signatories. The ﬁrst alternative is to conclude a plurilateral agreement under Art. II.3 WTO.
The second is to negotiate a so-called critical mass agreement
(CMA). In both cases negotiated disciplines apply only to signatories. They differ in that the beneﬁts of CMAs apply on a nondiscriminatory basis to all countries, including non-participating
nations, whereas Art. II:3 plurilateral agreements do not. An
example of a CMA is the Information Technology Agreement
(ITA). The main example of an Art. II plurilateral is the Agreement
on Government Procurement (GPA).
In considering different types of trade cooperation, countries must determine whether free-riding constraints apply
and, if so, what constitutes a critical mass of participation
that internalizes enough of the beneﬁts within the participating group of countries. CMAs are only feasible if most of
the beneﬁts associated with trade liberalization are internalized by participants. If not, the WTO MFN requirement will
preclude agreement. This constraint can be difﬁcult to overcome, as shown by ITA negotiations and the talks on an
Environmental Goods Agreement (EGA) to reduce tariffs on
products salient for reducing carbon emissions, which have
yet to be concluded.14 The ITA demonstrates that CMAs can
be negotiated, but also that a necessary condition is that
enough products are covered and a large enough set of
countries participate.15
The top part of Table 1 characterizes these different types
of trade agreements: multilateral package deals (trade
rounds), PTAs, CMAs and Art. II plurilateral agreements. All
involve policy commitments and international cooperation
among signatories. All address policies that by design discriminate and impede market access. The bottom part of
Table 1 presents forms of cooperation that are domainspeciﬁc, where the primary focus is not on liberalization
(constraining the use of discriminatory policies). Such cooperation can take the form of harmonization (e.g., a commitment to develop and adopt common standards),
implementing agreed good regulatory practices, and mutual
recognition of equivalence of regulatory regimes. Cooperation will often have a market access dimension, but the
focus is on domestic regulation.
The beneﬁts of cooperation may apply unconditionally to
all countries on a nondiscriminatory basis or on a conditional basis. Examples of the former include collaborative
efforts in fora such as the OECD and APEC to deﬁne good
Global Policy (2021) 12:Suppl.3

51

regulatory practices and agreement by countries to adopt
these. They also include international collaboration to
develop product and process standards in inter-governmental bodies such as the ISO. Cooperation involving identiﬁcation and agreement on good regulatory practices can be
applied on an unconditional MFN basis as it is insensitive to
free riding considerations: the policies are in the self-interest
of countries independent of whether other countries do so.
In many cases cooperation is likely to require joint action
by the parties. Such conditionality can vary in depth and
intensity, ranging from low to medium to high forms. A low
form example is mutual recognition of conformity assessment mechanisms. A medium form is what Mattoo (2018)
calls destination-speciﬁc exporter regulatory commitments,
where a regulator (government) accepts to look after the
interests of consumers in countries to which ﬁrms under its
jurisdiction export (as deﬁned by the regulatory authorities
in the importing nations), without necessarily adopting an
identical regulatory regime.16 A high form of conditionality
is a regulatory equivalence regime, in which the regulators
establish that regimes pursue similar objectives and are
implemented so as to achieve the shared goal, permitting
two-way ﬂow of the goods or services concerned. Countries
that do not have adequate regulatory capacity and enforcement institutions will not be able to beneﬁt from mutual
recognition, let alone equivalence arrangements.

Fitting JSIs into the WTO
An important question confronting JSI participants is the
form of cooperation that is envisaged. The JSIs provide an
opportunity to create OPAs, thereby demonstrating the
capacity of the WTO to encompass variable geometry and
cooperate on a nondiscriminatory basis. However, the JSI
talks are not explicitly aimed at negotiating OPAs. As mentioned, the MSME initiative is not aimed to result in a binding agreement, but is limited to ‘soft law’, best endeavortype commitments that will be embodied in a Ministerial
declaration signed by participating countries. The JSIs on ecommerce and services domestic regulation are linked to
existing WTO agreements and the outcome of negotiations
may be embedded in participating WTO members’ schedule
of commitments as opposed to a distinct agreement.
Scheduling in the GATT and/or GATS is less of an option for
the outcome of investment facilitation talks.
Inscribing the results of negotiations into participants’
GATT and/or GATS schedules will insulate signatories from
legal challenges by nonsignatories to whatever is agreed by
participants, as scheduling ensures that implementation will
occur on a nondiscriminatory basis (Hoekman and Mavroidis,
2017). At the same time embedding JSI outcomes into
national schedules makes the provisions enforceable
through the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
This may have implications for the feasibility of cooperation
that goes beyond the need for attaining critical mass to
address free riding concerns if this is a concern. As discussed below, the DSU may not be the most appropriate
instrument to support implementation of agreements that
© 2021 Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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Table 1. Alternative Instruments for Cooperation
Characteristics of cooperation outcome
Type of cooperation

Main issue

Type of spillover

Nondiscrimination (MFN)

Beneﬁts limited to participants

Type 1: Trade agreements
Binding State-to-State treaties
with ﬁxed terms and binding,
self-enforcing dispute resolution

Discriminatory
policies
affecting
market access

“Terms of trade”
effects of trade/
industrial policies
Pecuniary
spillovers

Multi-issue multilateral
agreements
(Uruguay and Doha
rounds)
Issue-speciﬁc critical mass
agreements
(e.g. Information
Technology Agreement;
GATS Telecom Reference
paper;
Environmental Goods
negotiations)
Open, nondiscrimination
International standard
setting (ISO, Codex
Alimentarius, UNECE)
Good regulatory practices
(OECD; APEC)
Open plurilateral
agreements

Reciprocal preferential trade
agreements (PTAs)

Type 2:
Open plurilateral cooperation
Severable, ﬂexible, dynamic,
issue-speciﬁc

Regulatory
heterogeneity

Cross border
effects of
domestic
regulatory
policies
Non-pecuniary
spillovers

•
•
•

go beyond disciplining the use of discriminatory policies.
Explicitly conceiving and designing the substantive elements
of what is agreed in the JSIs as an OPA could help to support successful cooperation by specifying enforcement
mechanisms that are better designed to serve the purpose
of signatories to an agreement.
OPAs differ from ‘standard’ trade agreements – ‘Type 1
cooperation’ – in at least four ways (Hoekman and Sabel,
2019). First, OPAs are open to participation of any country
able to satisfy the membership conditions, in contrast to
PTAs that generally are closed to access by new countries.
Second, insofar as OPAs address trade costs created by regulatory heterogeneity they do not lend themselves to quid
pro quo exchange of concessions – what Bhagwati (1988)
terms ﬁrst difference reciprocity. Third, because they are
domain speciﬁc, OPAs involve narrower and more limited
commitments. A member must only undertake to meet the
requirements that have been agreed for the issue or class of
goods and services concerned. Insofar as an OPA requires
only equivalent performance – not identical procedures or
institutions – they permit members to produce the required
outcome through their own regulatory regimes and institutions. Fourth, and related, implementation of OPAs calls for
continuing reciprocal review of existing regulatory policies
© 2021 Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

Digital
Economy
Partnerships
COVID-19-related
public health agreements
New WTO clubs

Issue-speciﬁc, discriminatory
plurilateral agreements under
Art. II WTO
(e.g. Government Procurement
Agreement)

Open, conditional application
Mutual recognition (conformity
assessment agreements)
Regulatory equivalence regimes
(Unilateral: EU data adequacy
ﬁndings
Bilateral: air safety agreements;
EU Forest Law Enforcement,
Governance and Trade regime
Clubs with trade penalty
defaults
(e.g., Agreement on Climate
Change, Trade & Sustainability
negotiations)

and their implementation, and joint evaluation of potential
adaption to changes in circumstances. The potential for
learning through regular interactions between regulators
and/or a broader epistemic community involved in a policy
area may also arise in the implementation of trade agreements but is less of a central feature given the narrow focus
on disciplining discrimination.
An implication of these different features is that OPAs
may require less in the way of cross-issue linkage to permit
cooperation. This is an explicit feature of the New Zealand,
Chile and Singapore Digital Economy Partnership Agreement
which is conceived to be open to any country interested in
joining, and to facilitate participation through a modular
design, allowing signatories to opt in or out of modules.
This is very different from a standard trade agreement. A
basic feature of all types of trade agreements is that they
involve cross-issue linkages.17 If a proposed agreement
reduces welfare for a country, linkage will be needed to satisfy the Pareto criterion, permitting cooperation if the beneﬁts from including another subject exceed the losses
associated with the initial proposal. Linkage may take many
forms, including adding/subtracting issues, compensation
mechanisms and side-payments.18 Maggi (2016) identiﬁes
three types of issue linkage in international agreements:
Global Policy (2021) 12:Suppl.3
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negotiation linkage; enforcement linkage and participation
linkage. All three are features of trade agreements. The ﬁrst
of these involves negotiating two or more issues in one
agreement, with the possibility of trade-offs across issues,
the goal being to conclude one agreement – a package deal
that is Pareto sanctioned: all participants are better off.
Given agreement, enforcement linkage involves action in
one issue area to enforce compliance with commitments in
another (cross-retaliation). An example is conditioning preferential access to the market on reform and enforcement of
labor standards or protection of human rights.19
Participation linkage comprises situations where the threat
of sanctions in one area induces participation in an agreement addressing another policy area. All three types of linkage fall under the broader concept of conditionality –
making cooperation in one area a condition for cooperation
in another. Conconi and Perroni (2002) contrast this notion
of conditionality with a separation rule, in which there are
explicit prohibitions on using linkage, e.g., applying (the
threat of) sanctions in one area to induce (enforce) cooperation in another.
Issue linkage may increase overall potential gains, but as
demonstrated by the failure of the Doha round, crafting a
negotiating agenda that delivers large enough net gains to
all parties is difﬁcult. This is true especially if there are groups
that lose from agreement to cooperate on a given policy
area. While overall, in the aggregate, there may be welfare
(real income) gains, in the absence of credible and effective
compensation for speciﬁc losses, negatively affected groups
have good reason to oppose a proposed deal. If policies are
separable, cross-issue linkage is not needed – the payoffs of
cooperation are independent of what governments may or
may not do in other policy areas. OPAs can be designed to
permit separability in the sense that if (part of) an OPA fails
this need not affect cooperation in other areas.
Trade agreements are self-enforcing – the threat of withdrawing concessions sustains cooperation. Binding dispute
settlement enforced by the (threat of) withdrawal of market
access is unlikely to be useful for encouraging cooperation
on regulatory matters. It is more likely to have a chilling
effect on the willingness to consider cooperation – due to
fear of uncertain contingent liability or views by regulators
that market access considerations will have adverse effects
on the realization of regulatory goals.20 Different systems
are needed to suport cooperation on regulatory matters,
based on transparency mechanisms (information collection,
incident reporting, sharing of data, dialogue) and, as Hoekman and Sabel (2019) argue, severability. The latter is a feature of the CPTPP chapter on regulatory coherence which is
not subject to binding dispute resolution. This was also
taken off the table by the EU in the aborted TTIP talks.
Enforcement linkages may be required in domain-speciﬁc
cooperation where the aim is to internalize negative crossborder spillovers. These may be pecuniary or nonpecuniary.
Examples include policy areas such as subsidies, activities of
state-owned enterprises (SOEs), digital economy policies and
cooperation in the use of trade policies to reduce national
carbon footprints. In such cases retaliation within the
Global Policy (2021) 12:Suppl.3
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domain of the policy area is not desirable. Enforcement linkage is needed instead.
The domain-speciﬁc nature of OPAs and limited salience
of enforcement mechanisms that rely on the threat of ceasing to apply what was agreed implies a need for variable
geometry when it comes to enforcement. If cooperation
involves implementation of good practices and a party to
an OPA comes to believe that other approaches should be
applied, this calls for discussion between parties to assess
the reasons underlying a decision to pursue a different path.
Matters are different for cooperation centering on polices
that generate negative international spillovers, where the
threat of retaliation may be effective. The upshot is that
careful consideration is needed both when designing the
substance of an agreement and the type of enforcement
mechanism that is appropriate.
The Working Party on Domestic Regulation that was the
precursor to the JSI on services regulation proved unable to
achieve consensus on criteria determining whether (when)
restrictions on trade are needed to attain a regulatory objective and whether disciplines should encompass private standard-setting bodies (Delimatsis, 2008; Hoekman and
Mavroidis, 2016). Similarly, the e-commerce work program
launched in 1999 did not lead to speciﬁc suggestions supported by the membership, aside from a time limited agreement not to levy taxes on data ﬂows that has periodically
been extended. Lack of progress in coming to an agreement, notwithstanding extensive deliberation and effort,
was in (large) part due to WTO members demanding (crossissue) linkages with the Doha round,21 tactics that were in
turn facilitated by the (perceived) need to anchor the outcome of discussions to existing WTO agreements. Shifting
the focus to stand-alone agreements, even if implemented
in part through incorporation of negotiated provisions into
the existing schedules of participating WTO members, may
facilitate getting to yes. In the case of services regulation
such scheduling is straightforward, but in the case of e-commerce an OPA that addresses speciﬁc policies may be more
efﬁcient and effective than adding to extant GATT, GATS
and/or TRIPS commitments. An OPA permits updating and
improving salient existing WTO agreements in a more comprehensive and holistic manner, as the salient WTO agreements have become outdated, for example, the sectoral
classiﬁcation and categorization of ‘modes of supply’ in the
GATS (Nakatomi, 2019). An OPA can also make explicit
whether and when the DSU applies and expand the scope
for cooperation by deﬁning alternative conﬂict resolution
arrangements for speciﬁc matters where the DSU is not
appropriate or effective.

Preparing the ground for more variable geometry
in the WTO
What follows brieﬂy discusses actions to support negotiation
of OPAs, in the process highlighting areas where current JSIs
could be strengthened and measures proponents of OPAs
should consider in moving forward. The prospects for successful OPA negotiations will be enhanced if they are based on a
© 2021 Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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solid evidence base, address a serious problem of concern to
a clear constituency, are transparent as regards deliberations
and eventual implementation, open to new members, and
encompass appropriate conﬂict resolution systems. The latter
can build on innovations that have been introduced in several
extant WTO agreements, such as discussion of ‘speciﬁc trade
concerns’ (STCs) in WTO committees (Karttunen, 2020) and
recourse to experts to assess reasons for non-implementation
of an agreement, as is foreseen in the WTO Agreement on
Trade Facilitation (Hoekman and Sabel, 2019).
Informing deliberations: epistemic communities and
extant PTAs
Successful international agreements addressing regulatory
policies such as the WTO agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary measures, technical barriers to trade and trade
facilitation are all associated with a body of agreed technical
knowledge and accumulated good will among the relevant
national regulatory agencies. Haas (1992) refers to a group
of stakeholders and experts linked in this way as an epistemic community. Speciﬁcally, he deﬁnes an epistemic community as a group of professionals who share:

•
•
•
•

a set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a
value-based rationale for the social action of community
members;
causal beliefs, derived from their analysis of practices to
address problems in their domain, that serve as the basis
for understanding how possible policy actions can support desired outcomes;
notions of validity – criteria for weighing and validating
knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and
a set of common practices – associated with the problems to which their professional competence is directed
with a view to enhance welfare.

There are many policy domains in which such epistemic
communities help support international cooperation, including trade facilitation (Hoekman, 2016), product safety (Yates
and Murphy, 2019), competition policy (Kovacic and Hollman, 2011) and environmental policy (Sabel and Victor,
2017). A necessary condition for successful OPAs is a community that has an interest in international regulatory cooperation and a mechanism that supports informed
deliberation in each policy area.22 Such fora can generate
information on applied policies across countries, facilitate
sharing experiences and help to identify good practices that
reﬂect and respond to local capabilities and priorities. APEC,
the OECD, United Nations agencies and the World Bank are
examples of entities that provide institutional homes for this
type of engagement.
In the TFA context, such a community was organized
around the WCO (which brings together all national customs
administrations) and several international organizations),
including UNCTAD, ITC, OECD, the World Bank and the
Inter-American Development Bank. Many of the regulatory
standards referred to in the TFA were established in relevant
international standards-setting bodies, notably the WCO.
© 2021 Durham University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

The WTO is not the appropriate institution for discussion on
the substance of regulatory standards and makes no claim
to that effect. It is a trade facilitating organization, not a
standards setter. International regulatory cooperation and
standardization efforts are important but are – and should
be – pursued outside the WTO. This applies to areas
addressed by WTO agreements such as the trade effects of
product standards (the TBT and SPS agreements) and to
areas that may become the subject of new WTO agreements
or OPAs, for example, the regulation of the digital economy.
What matters for trade cooperation is that the trade community connects to the relevant epistemic communities and
standards setting organizations when considering efforts to
reduce the trade-impeding effects of domestic regulatory
regimes.
The prevalence/role of epistemic communities varies
across the JSIs. Two of the JSIs – e-commerce and domestic
regulation of services – build on long-standing discussions
in the WTO, and in both instances international business is
an important demandeur for multilateral rules, reﬂected in
active engagement by organizations such as the US Coalition of Service Industries and the European Services Forum.
Digital trade has become a central focus of many APEC governments as well as the EU. The e-commerce JSI builds on
the experience obtained in negotiating provisions on digital
trade and e-commerce in recent PTAs,23 elements of which
were included in the Regional Comprehensive Economic
Partnership agreement that was concluded at the end of
2020. RCEP includes the 10 Association of Southeast Asian
Nations (ASEAN) countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia,
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam), and Australia, China, Japan, New Zealand
and South Korea. Because China is a signatory, RCEP may
provide a baseline for what is feasible to agree in the JSI
talks, although many OECD member countries are seeking
to go signiﬁcantly beyond what is embodied in RCEP.24
The recent experience of Asia-Paciﬁc countries in negotiating digital partnerships mentioned previously reveals that
there are differences in preferences and the feasibility of
negotiating plurilateral digital trade agreements even
among like-minded economies with very similar regulatory
objectives. One reason for the multiplicity of digital trade
agreements emerging in the Paciﬁc is that countries are not
all on the same page. This is not surprising and should not
be an impediment to cooperation. It suggests the value of
JSI participants seeking to create a digital trade OPA that
establishes a common denominator set of provisions, and
that is ﬂexible in the sense of being able to incorporate
modules that need not be adopted by all OPA members
and that encourage regular interaction between authorities
and stakeholders on the experience with implementing digital trade-related cooperation that spans only a few of its
members. This is also an argument for seeking to pursue an
OPA under the umbrella of the WTO as opposed to pursuing cooperation outside the WTO.25
The JSIs on investment facilitation and MSMEs beneﬁtted
from joint engagement between G20 members and international organizations working through the G20 Trade and
Global Policy (2021) 12:Suppl.3
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Investment Working Group (TIWG). While this was a factor in
moving the issues onto the WTO agenda, in comparison to
the other two groups there are less clearly deﬁned epistemic communities with a strong stake in international
cooperation. This in turn is reﬂected in the discussions being
centered on identifying good domestic practices – the focus
(mandate) of most of the international organizations participating in the TIWG.
In the case of MSMEs the informal working group is largely driven by governments and international organizations,
notably the Geneva-based International Trade Centre. International industry associations are less of a factor reﬂecting
the nature of MSMEs, although organizations such as the
ICC have been supportive, as has been the WEF. Given that
the focus of deliberation is on good practice measures to
support internationalization of small ﬁrms that can (will) be
implemented on a voluntary basis,26 there is no concern
regarding free riding and neither scope nor need for crossissue linkages or enforcement. The working group ﬁnalized
a package of six recommendations and declarations to facilitate the participation of smaller businesses in international
trade towards the end of 2020. Although voluntary, going
beyond a Ministerial Declaration to create an OPA on
MSMEs would have value by establishing a permanent focal
point for deliberation and a platform for review of progress
in adoption of the recommendations, sharing experiences
by engaging with MSME representatives and orchestrating
technical assistance programs.
Several international organizations – UNCTAD, the World
Bank – have actively supported the investment facilitation
agenda, but there no analogue to the role played by WCO
in the TFA talks, that is, no international organization representing (bringing together) the national agencies responsible for the administration of investment-related policies. As
argued by Berger et al. (2019), one reﬂection of this is that
there has been limited empirical research on the impact of
a potential agreement to help identify what an agreement
could do to promote development or assist negotiators to
focus on measures based on the size of likely beneﬁts and
the potential need for technical assistance for developing
countries.
A multilateral governance framework for OPAs
Plurilateral initiatives offer a means to attenuate the need
for consensus, but they raise potential concerns for nonmembers. Even if agreements do not discriminate – which is
the presumption – countries that decide not to participate
may have an interest in what is agreed to constitute good
practice by a plurilateral group. In part this is because they
may want to participate later, and in part because their
ﬁrms may have to comply with regulatory policies adopted
by a club of WTO members. In practice not all countries will
be able to engage on an equal footing in the negotiation of
an OPA. There are major differences in capacities to engage
on regulatory matters and the ability to participate in a fully
informed way. Some governments may ﬁnd it difﬁcult to
determine the ‘return’ to applying a proposed rule. This
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suggests that any OPA should include an aid for trade component – mechanisms to assist countries improve their standards, regulation, etc., to the level that is required to beneﬁt
from the OPA. Including an operational aid for trade dimension in OPAs could enhance their relevance to low-income
countries and enhance their inclusiveness.
Ensuring that agreements are truly open to any country
wishing to join, are fully transparent, and encourage participation by international and sectoral organizations with relevant expertise could help address potential concerns of
nonmembers. Particularly important are to put in place
mechanisms to assist countries not able to participate
despite being interested in doing so because of weaknesses
in institutional capacity and capabilities. While there is no
basis for litigation on the substance of an OPA if it is scheduled and applied on a nondiscriminatory basis (Hoekman
and Mavroidis, 2017), an agreed set of principles that apply
to new OPAs would provide assurance that incorporation of
such clubs is consistent with the goals of the multilateral
trade system. The absence of such a governance framework
is a gap in ongoing JSI discussions in the WTO: it arguably
reduces the incentive for nonparticipants to accept efforts
by WTO members to form clubs and the credibility of claims
by proponents that the aim is to promote multilateral cooperation.
Addressing these types of concerns is important. One way
to do so is through establishment of a code of conduct that
signatories of plurilateral agreements commit to apply. Providing a governance framework for new plurilateral agreements that ensures they are consistent with multilateralism
would help to recognize valid concerns of nonmembers.27
This can take the form of binding code of conduct that is
incorporated in the schedules of commitments of WTO
members that decide to apply them. There is a precedent
for this in the GATS Reference Paper on basic telecommunications, which sets out speciﬁc obligations on the behavior
of telecom operators that control access to the network.
These disciplines become binding on signatories, and thus
enforceable, through inclusion of the Reference Paper into
their schedule of GATS commitments. Such inclusion cannot
be blocked by any country as WTO members are free to
make additional commitments if they wish to (Hoekman
and Mavroidis, 2017). A Reference Paper on OPAs could be
incorporated in the schedules of members who drafted it,
with any WTO member interested in participating in an OPA
negotiation or acceding to an OPA accepting to incorporate
the paper into their schedules. As amendment of the WTO
to include new provisions to govern the design elements of
OPAs will be difﬁcult if not impossible given the need for
consensus, a pragmatic approach to incorporating a code of
conduct is for a common Reference Paper to be incorporated into each new OPA that is negotiated.
A Reference Paper on OPAs could include the following
elements and provisions:
1. membership of an OPA is voluntary; WTO members that
decide not to participate will not be pressured to join at
a later date;
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2. an OPA must be implemented on a nondiscriminatory
basis, with beneﬁts extending to nonsignatories;
3. openness to subsequent membership by WTO Members
that did not join when an OPA was ﬁrst agreed, and inclusion of a section laying out the requirements and procedures to be followed for accession by aspiring members;28
4. language stating that accession to an OPA cannot be on
terms that are more stringent than those that applied to
the incumbent parties, adjusted for any changes in substantive disciplines adopted by signatories over time;29
5. an obligation to provide reasons to accession-seeking
countries for decisions to reject membership applications;
6. a provision committing signatories to provide assistance
to WTO members that are not in a position to satisfy
the preconditions for membership in terms of applying
the substantive provisions of the agreement but desire
to do so;30
7. where feasible and in instances where capacities must
be built for a country to meet OPA requirements, consideration be given to establish a stepwise schedule of
compliance;
8. provisions ensuring that nonparticipants have full information on the implementation and operation of the
agreement. These should include:
a. compliance with WTO requirements pertaining to
publication of information on measures covered by
the OPA (along lines of Art. X GATT),
b. simple, robust notiﬁcation requirements for OPA
members regarding the implementation of the
agreement, which could draw on recent proposals to
develop augmented procedural guidelines for the
operation of WTO bodies,31
c. creation of a body to oversee implementation of the
OPA that is open to observation by nonsignatories,
including mechanisms to engage stakeholders in an
ongoing conversation about how the agreement is
working and future needs,32
d. annual reporting to the WTO General Council by the
OPA on its activities.
e. a mandate for the WTO Secretariat to assess the
effects of implementing OPAs on the functioning of
the trading system as part of the Director-General’s
annual monitoring report of developments in the
trading system;
9. inclusion of consultation and conﬂict resolution procedures for non-signatories of OPAs in cases where they
perceive that incumbents do not live up to the foregoing principles; and
10. provisions indicating whether the OPA envisages
recourse to WTO dispute settlement mechanisms to
enforce the agreement, and if so, specifying the standard of review as well as the criteria that will apply in
the selection of arbitrators.
These principles do not include a binding requirement to
provide ‘special and differential treatment’ (SDT) of the type
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currently embodied in the WTO which permits developing
countries to offer ‘less than full reciprocity’. This traditional
notion of SDT would defeat a major rationale for pursuing
many OPAs: to permit a subset of countries to cooperate in
areas not covered by WTO rules or to go beyond them by
adopting what all agree are good policy practices. Insofar as
OPAs deal with regulatory matters it makes no sense to consider that some countries should only partially implement
whatever standards and processes are agreed, as this would
undercut the achievement of common regulatory objectives
of OPA members. The requirement that parties to OPAs
must assist nonmembers desiring to participate but unable
to do so because of capacity weaknesses addresses development differences more effectively than traditional SDT, and
consideration of stepwise accession of new members
addresses the problem of capacity constraints.
Enforcement considerations
The need for enforcement and recourse to DSU in an important design decision for potential OPAs. There are two
dimensions to this question. The ﬁrst concerns the type of
cooperation that is envisaged – binding or best endeavors –
and if binding, the substance of disciplines and the associated standard of review. The second concerns the ability of
nonsignatories to invoke the DSU to challenge signatories of
JSI agreements.
Apart from the MSME case, if successful, the JSIs are
likely to involve a mix of hard and soft law, akin to what is
found in the TFA. The presumption of WTO members
engaged in JSIs appears to be that if binding commitments
are agreed, the DSU will apply. In the case of investment
facilitation, for example, the EU has made this explicit (EU,
2020). If commitments pertain to discriminatory application
of policies, recourse to dispute settlement is straightforward
– the matter is no different from bringing cases under current WTO agreements. The ability to bring such cases
would span both signatories and nonsignatories given the
presumption that signatories apply agreements on a MFN
basis. The delicate part will be to deﬁne what MFN means
when it comes to provisions of an OPA pertaining to regulatory regimes, for example, data adequacy, privacy, etc.
Whether the DSU should – or even can – apply deserves
careful consideration. In practice, it is very unlikely that regulators will accept to have a WTO panel second guess their
decisions. This was demonstrated in the context of the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) negotiations, which removed the possibility of disputes being
brought based on the regulatory cooperation chapter
(Hoekman and Sabel, 2018). Analogously, the effort to
establish ‘necessity test’ criteria in the WTO talks on services domestic regulation arguably was a major factor
impeding success, given the associated prospect of litigation, even if the focus of an agreement were to be limited
to procedural/process requirements.
As noted previously, aside from commitments to refrain
from explicit discrimination against foreign ﬁrms and
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service providers, recourse to the DSU may not serve signatories to an agreement. Alternative mechanisms are likely
to be required. For example, insofar as enforceable provisions will be agreed in an investment facilitation agreement, alternatives to the DSU, including deliberations in
the body charged with oversight of the agreement, consultations between parties informed by independent expert
groups to understand and propose solutions to implementation problems, and regular independent monitoring of
implementation progress may be more suitable. This in
turn is a strong argument for crafting OPAs to provide the
framework for cooperation. Each OPA can specify that measures involving disciplines on the use of discriminatory
instruments will be subject to the DSU while providing for
alternative conﬂict resolution procedures for regulatory
matters.
If parties to an OPA decide to rely on the DSU for dispute
settlement for matters that do not pertain to discrimination,
it is important to specify the standard of review that applies,
for example, limiting disputes on regulatory matters to procedural commitments that have been agreed, with no scope
for striking down a jurisdiction’s substantive regulations. Disputes should be arbitrated by people with the salient professional background and expertise who understand the
institutional context and the goals of a given agreement.
This in turn requires revisiting the current process of selecting panelists which tends to draw from a pool of trade
diplomats who are unlikely to have the requisite specialist
knowledge of contested issues.
The second dimension of enforcement concerns the ability and mechanism through which nonsignatories can challenge JSI members regarding the implementation of an
agreement. Suppose a non-signatory WTO member C
claims that its regulatory regime is equivalent to those of
JSI agreement members A and B, whereas the latter decide
to the contrary. If C has not expressed an interest in joining the negotiated agreement this should exclude it from
bringing such litigation insofar as the application of provisions is conditional on joint action that permit cooperation
between A and B. But what if C has sought to join an OPA
and A and B reject it based, for example, on differences in
regulatory regimes that are such to not permit C to be
included? Similar issues arise in cases where incumbent
OPA members are alleged to impose more stringent
requirements on countries wishing to accede to an OPA
than apply to insiders.
Assuming enforceable principles along the lines suggested above are agreed, such questions also arise for signatories of OPAs. Is the DSU the appropriate instrument?
One reason it may not be is that the standard remedy – a
call to bring measures into compliance – is unlikely to be
very meaningful. Another is that a standard WTO panel and
the Appellate Body may not be well placed to determine if
authorities in a signatory are acting inconsistently with one
of more principles. What is called for instead are approaches
that put the emphasis on engagement between the relevant
authorities that aim to establish the facts of a matter in an
objective and independent manner, providing information
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that can serve as a basis to identify actions that can be
taken to support the realization the principles that are
agreed to apply to OPAs. The type of expert advisory group
process that was incorporated in the TFA is a good example,
as it is premised on a presumption of good faith and
focuses on identifying and resolving speciﬁc implementation
problems. Putting in place such implementation supporting
mechanisms is likely to be beneﬁcial to the WTO more
broadly, complementing innovations that have been put in
place over time by WTO committees, such as the use of
STCs (Karttunen, 2020; Wolfe, 2020).

Conclusions
Plurilateral agreements are nothing new for the trade
regime. They were a core element of the GATT, permitting
like-minded jurisdictions to agree on rules that applied only
to signatories. In the transition to the WTO, it was decided
that most extant ‘Tokyo Round codes’ would be incorporated into the WTO as multilateral agreements and thus
apply to all WTO members, including the many developing
countries that had not signed them. This was possible
because it was made part of a take or leave it package deal
– it was made part and parcel of accession to the WTO. At
the time this linkage strategy was pursued by code signatories to induce (force) all GATT contracting parties to implement what had been negotiated in the various plurilateral
agreements during the 1970s and 1980s (Hoekman and Kostecki, 2009). In retrospect this stratagem looks much less
strategic than many high-income country negotiators perceived it to be. Fear of potentially being confronted with a
situation where countries would be forced to join agreements in the future became a reason why many developing
countries used the consensus working practice to oppose
efforts to engage in deliberations on ‘new’ issues, in turn
incentivizing the turn to deep PTAs. Returning to the GATT
model where plurilateral agreements were a feature, not a
bug, could do much to support cooperation on a range of
policy areas without entailing the need for complex and
inﬂexible trade agreements.
Success in converting the JSIs into agreements would
help establish a foundation for WTO members interested in
pursuing additional rulemaking. Plurilateral cooperation is
not a panacea. It can however be part of the answer to the
difﬁculties the WTO membership has experienced in
addressing trade conﬂicts and negotiating new agreements.
Much of what is on the table in the JSIs involves coordination failures and efforts to identify good regulatory practices.
This is valuable. The subjects of discussion are all areas
where there are signiﬁcant potential gains from cooperation
and policy coordination. However, apart from the e-commerce talks, they do not address fundamental sources of
recent trade tensions and conﬂicts. Preparing the ground for
efforts to do so would ensure the WTO stays relevant in the
21st century.
There are many policy issues that generate spillovers that
could be addressed by OPAs. Incorporating the results of
JSIs into formal OPAs will help establish a basis for large
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trading powers to consider using OPAs to agree on rules of
the game in a range of contested policy areas. An example
is the use of trade policy instruments in programs to combat climate change. The Paris Agreement authorizes countries to set national decarbonization targets and to form
sector-speciﬁc ‘climate clubs’ for joint pursuit of national targets (Nordhaus, 2015). An implication of the voluntary nature of national commitments under Paris is that any penalty
defaults deﬁned by climate clubs involving trade restrictions
fall outside Paris. Although countries can invoke the general
exceptions provision of the WTO to justify the use of trade
measures as part of decarbonization initiatives, an OPA can
make explicit how trade sanctions will be applied among
members of the OPA to attain decarbonization targets they
have agreed. The ongoing negotiations between Costa Rica,
Fiji, Iceland, New Zealand and Norway on an Agreement on
Climate Change, Trade and Sustainability are seeking to do
this. Preparing the ground for OPAs on these matters
requires preparation, including data collection and analysis
to assess the magnitude of spillovers and provide a basis for
informed deliberation on the need for and potential form of
international cooperation. This was a central necessary condition for the successful conclusion of the TFA. Launching
such deliberations and developing a common understanding of what is at stake and what can be done is an important input into negotiating OPAs (Hoekman and Nelson,
2020).
The scope for using OPAs as an instrument for cooperation would beneﬁt from actions to facilitate deliberation in
the WTO (Wolfe, 2021) and from agreeing on a set of principles that participants in OPAs would sign on to. Much also
depends on re-establishing an effective multilateral dispute
settlement system. This is a key element of the ‘value
proposition’ offered by the WTO: providing a de-politicized
third-party system to enforce disciplines on the use of discriminatory policies. Action to ensure that the system can
work effectively is therefore an important part of making
the WTO ﬁt for purpose to attenuate negative spillovers
caused by domestic policies. As important is to develop and
build on alternative conﬂict resolution mechanisms that
have been used in WTO committees and that are needed to
support regulatory cooperation. OPAs offer an opportunity
to do so and in the process contribute to renovating this
function of the WTO.
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See https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news17_e/minis_13dec
17_e.htm
See, e.g., Hoekman and Kostecki (2009).
China was a co-sponsor of three of the four groups in 2017. Initially
China did not participate in the JSI on e-commerce, but it joined
subsequently.
As of end 2020, only ﬁve African countries participated: Benin,
Cameroun, Ivory Coast, Kenya and Nigeria.
For a summary of the issues that have been tabled by different
participants, see https://etradeforall.org/wto-members-submit-pro
posals-aimed-at-advancing-exploratory-e-commerce-work/ and Ismail
(2020).
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news20_e/msmes_05nov20_e.
htm
See Campos-Leal et al. (2020).
https://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news19_e/infac_05nov19_e.
htm. See Bali~
no et al. (2020).
Chile, New Zealand and Singapore (2020); https://www.mfat.govt.
nz/en/trade/free-trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements-conc
luded-but-not-in-force/digital-economy-partnership-agreement/.
Australia and Singapore (2020); https://www.dfat.gov.au/trade/se
rvices-and-digital-trade/Pages/australia-and-singapore-digital-ec
onomy-agreement
The agreement bans data localization, barriers to cross-border data
ﬂows and conditioning access to the market on transfer of source
code or algorithms, and covers ﬁnancial services. See https://ustr.
gov/sites/default/ﬁles/ﬁles/agreements/japan/Agreement_between_
the_United_States_and_Japan_concerning_Digital_Trade.pdf
https://www.mti.gov.sg/-/media/MTI/Newsroom/Press-Releases/
2020/06/22-Jun-2020-Singapore-and-the-Republic-of-Korea-launchnegotiations-on-Digital-Partnership-Agreement.pdf
https://www.mfat.govt.nz/en/media-and-resources/ministry-stateme
nts-and-speeches/trade-ministers-express-support-for-the-agreeme
nt-on-climate-change-trade-and-sustainability-at-the-world-econo
mic-forum-davos-2020/ The UK has indicated potential interest in
joining these negotiations.
Mavroidis and Neven (2019) and De Melo and Solleder (2020)
assess reasons for the difﬁculties in concluding the EGA negotiations successfully.
Gnutzmann-Mkrtchyan and Henn (2018) analyze the economic
dimensions of the ITA.
One can ask what the incentive is for the importing country to
negotiate an agreement to this effect, insofar as it can – and presumably will – impose its domestic standards on imports. One possible reason is agreement permits cross-issue linkages to be made;
another is that agreement may assist the exporting country to
obtain assistance in strengthening institutional capacity needed for
implementation.
See e.g., Conconi and Perroni (2002) and Lim~ao (2005).
On issue linkage and international cooperation see Haas (1980),
Sebenius (1983), McGinnis (1986).
A feature of nonreciprocal trade preference programs in which
richer countries grant poorer countries better access to their markets without requiring the latter to offer reciprocity in terms of market opening is that conditionality may be imposed in other policy
areas, that is, there is cross-issue linkage. See for example, Borchert
et al. (2020).
Such concerns were an important factor in the demise of talks in
the WTO on competition policy in the early 2000s. Competition
authorities held the view that their mandate was to safeguard
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26.
27.
28.

29.

30.
31.
32.

consumer interests, the contestability of markets and national welfare. In doing so, they do not distinguish between the behavior of
domestic and foreign ﬁrms on the market, as opposed to the focus
of trade negotiators on improving conditions of competition for
national ﬁrms.
A precursor Working Party on Professional Services agreed in 1998
on a set of principles for regulation of licensing of accountants and
accountancy services. These were adopted by the Council on Trade
in Services in 1998 but did not enter into force because of linkage
to a successful conclusion of the Doha round negotiations.
See Hoekman and Sabel (2019); Hoekman and Nelson (2020). Sebenius (1992) discusses the importance of considering the interaction
between the existence of epistemic communities and the form of
bargaining that is pursued, including the scope/use of issue linkage.
Burri (2021), Burri and Polanco (2020), Meltzer (2020), Mitchell and
Mishra (2020) and Wu (2017) discuss the coverage of digital trade
and e-commerce in recent PTAs.
The RCEP chapter on e-commerce includes provisions on consumer
protection, protection of personal information, acceptance of e-signatures, measures requiring consent and removal of unsolicited
spam at request of recipients that are similar to the CPTPP. Language on localization requirements and cross-border data ﬂows is
signiﬁcantly weaker. In any event, provisions in the e-commerce
chapter are excluded from dispute settlement. Instead, members
are called on to consult bilaterally and raise a matter in RCEP Joint
Committee. Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Vietnam have
5 years longer to implement different e-commerce provisions.
The various digital partnership agreements negotiated by Singapore are a case in point. Singapore has one with Chile and New
Zealand, another with Australia, and is negotiating a third with
South Korea. An OPA on digital trade in the WTO would provide a
platform on which such agreements could be based, permitting
deeper cooperation among a subset of countries. Such an OPA
could also provide a forum for exchange of information on data
adequacy equivalence decisions and deliberation on potential plurilateralization of bilateral initiatives. It is interesting to observe that
the EU has recognized New Zealand as providing adequate data
protection, but not Australia, whereas Australia has a digital economy agreement with Singapore that goes further than the digital
economy partnership between Singapore, New Zealand and
Chile.26
See Campos-Leal et al. (2020).
This suggestion was ﬁrst made by Lawrence (2006). See also Hoekman and Mavroidis (2015).
Open access in the sense that once negotiated any OPA must permit accession by any WTO Member is not explicitly required in Art.
X(9) WTO.
This leaves open the possibility that parties to an OPA can offer
accession on less demanding terms for developing countries if they
agree to do so, but for reasons discussed below does not make this
obligatory.
Such provisions can draw on the approach embodied in the TFA –
see e.g., Hoekman (2016).
See Wolfe (2018) for an extended discussion on improving notiﬁcation processes and performance.
Wolfe (2021) suggests options for WTO bodies to organize periodic
sessions that focus on learning and engagement with stakeholders.
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